The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
Introduction
A social choice function aggregates the preferences of all members of society towards a common social choice. Formally, let [m] be a set of m alternatives (candidates), over which n voters have preferences. The preferences of the ith voter are specified as x i ∈ L, where L denotes the set of full orders over [m] (thus L corresponds to S m ). Using this notation, a social choice function is a function f : L n → [m]. We will also write the vector x of preferences as (x i , x −i ) when wanting to single out the vote of the i'th voter, or as (x i , x −i ) after changing the ith coordinate to x i .
There is a vast literature on the design of social choice functions, also called voting methods or election rules.
One of the basic desired properties from a social choice function is implied by our thinking of them as "asking the voters about their preferences": voters should not gain from reporting false preferences rather than their true ones. Formally: Definition 1. A (profitable) manipulation by voter i of a social choice function f at profile (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a preference x i such that f (x i , x −i ) is preferred by voter i to f (x i , x −i ).
Intuitively, if such a manipulation exists, then voter i would be better off by "voting strategically": reporting x i * ehudf@math.huji.ac.il, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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‡ noam.nisan@gmail.com, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem as his preference rather than the true x i . The GibbardSatherwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75] states that every "nontrivial" social choice function is strategically vulnerable, where "nontrivial" means not a dictatorship and whose range contains at least three alternatives. In this paper we ask how often does this happen: for what fraction of profiles does such a manipulation exist? 1 Can it be tiny? Perhaps exponentially small? While some previous work studied specific classes of social choice functions (e.g. [Ke93] ), we provide a fairly general negative answer for the case of 3 alternatives. Let us define the following quantification of the probability of a random manipulation:
Definition: The manipulation power of voter i on a social choice function f , denoted M i (f ), is the probability that x i is a profitable manipulation of f by voter i at profile (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n and x i are chosen uniformly at random among all full orders on [m].
This definition assumes a uniform distribution over preferences, which while certainly unrealistic, is the natural choice for proving a "lower bound" 2 . In particular, the lower bound, up to a factor δ, applies also to any distribution that gives each preference profile at least a δ fraction of the probability given by the uniform distribution.
To formally state our main theorem, we will require a few standard definitions: A social choice function is neutral if the names of the candidates "do not matter", formally, if f commutes with permutations of
is a social choice function that always chooses the top choice of a fixed voter. The distance of f from a dictatorship is simply the minimal fraction of values that need to be changed to turn f into a dictatorship.
Main Theorem: There exists a constant C > 0 such that For every > 0, if f is a neutral social choice function 1 Functions that are very close to being a dictatorship may have a very small number of such manipulable profiles (e.g. [MPS04]), so this paper is concerned with social choice functions that are far from being trivial.
2 Note that we cannot hope for an impossibility result for every distribution, e.g. since for every social choice function we can take a distribution on its non-manipulable profiles. among 3 alternatives for n voters that is -far from dictatorship, then:
This immediately implies that for fixed , some voter has non-negligible manipulation power max i M i (f ) ≥ Ω(1/n). It is easy to see that one cannot bound max i M i (f ) below by a constant independently of n since for the plurality voting method M i (f ) = θ(1/ √ n) Furthermore, for the plurality voting method only for a 1/ √ n fraction of profiles can manipulated at all by any single player. While it is easy to see that the bound on i M i (f ) cannot be improved to being more than a constant, the first open problem we leave is whether the bound on max i M i (f ) can be improved further. We also do not know how to replace the neutrality condition with the weaker "correct" condition: being far from having a range of size at most 2. We leave this as the second open problem.
Our third open problem concerns the case of more than three alternatives, m > 3. While some parts of our proof extend to this case, (and indeed we took the care to state them in the general form), we were not able to extend all required parts of the proof. We do conjecture that the theorem does generalize to m > 3, perhaps with the exact form of the bound decreasing polynomially in m. This is our third open problem.
This would have implications regarding a recent line of research attempting to find social choice functions that are computationally hard to manipulate on the average. It is known that for several social choice functions, manipulation, as an algorithmic problem, is NP-complete [BTT89, BO91] . Several authors asked whether this computational hardness can also be extended to the average case -a computational version of our question -and some "computational hardness augmentation" techniques have been given [CS03, EL05] . Some results for restricted classes of social choice functions have been obtained previously [PR06], [CS06] , but no general results. Our conjecture implies that even a random attempted manipulation has nonnegligible probability of being profitable, and thus that the computational hardness of manipulation in the average case is trivial.
A word is in order regarding our techniques. Our starting point is the recent work of [Ka02] that obtained quantitative versions of Arrow's theorem [Arr51] using methods that involve the Fourier transform on the boolean hypercube. Our proof then has two further components. First, a "quantitative-preserving" reduction from Arrow's theorem to a variant of the Gibbard-Satherwaite theorem that allows multi-voter manipulation, and then a directed isoperimetric inequality that allows us to move to single-voter manipulation. Our proof of the isoperimetric inequality relies on the FKG correlation inequality [FKG71] (or, more precisely, on Harris' inequality, [Ha60] ).
Preliminaries and Notation

Preferences
Denote by L the set of total orders on [m]. We view L as a subset of the space {0, 1} ( m 2 ) , in which each bit denotes the "preference" between two alternatives, where in L these must be transitive, but in {0, 1} ( m 2 ) not necessarily so. We will denote the input from society by a matrix x where we also view x as a column vector (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ L n , where each coordinate x i is a row vector of the form n ). Given any two functions f, g from a probability space X to a set Y we denote the distance between f and g as
If G is a family of such functions we define Δ(f, G) = min g∈G Δ(f, g). In our setting X will always be endowed with the uniform probability, so the distance between two functions is nothing else than the proportion of inputs on which the functions disagree. Note that if F is a GSWF which is both neutral and IIA then it is determined by a single Boolean function f :
Social Choice Functions
Social Welfare Functions
The neutrality also implies that in this case f is an odd function: f (x) = 1 − f (x), wherē x i = 1 − x i . In this case we will write F = f ⊗( m 2 ) .
Dictatorships
As usual in Arrow-type theorems we will be concerned with functions f (x), where x is a vector and f depends only on a single coordinate x i .
The i-dictatorship SCF is given by dict i (x) being the top element in x i . The i-anti-dictatorship SCF is given by dict i (x) being the bottom element in x i . We denote the set of dictatorships and anti-dictatorships by DICT .
The i-dictatorship SWF is given by Dict i (x) = x i , here, of course, x i is an order. The i-anti-dictatorship is given by Dict i (x) = x i , where x i is the reverse of x i . We denote the set of dictatorships and anti-dictatorships by DICT , as we did with SCFs. (It will always be clear from the context whether we mean a SCF or a SWF).
Finally we will also use DICT to denote the set of Boolean functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} that depend on a single coordinate, i.e f (x) = x i or f (x) = 1 − x i .
Overview of the proof
We recall our definition of manipulation power and our main theorem. Definition 2. The manipulation power of voter i on a social choice function f denoted M i (f ), is the probability that x i is a profitable manipulation of f by voter i at profile x 1 ...x n , where x 1 ...x n and x i are chosen uniformly at random in L n .
Theorem 1.
There exists a constant C > 0 such that for every > 0 the following holds. If f is a neutral SCF for n voters over 3 alternatives and Δ(f, g) > for any dictatorship g, then f has total manipulability:
This theorem is proved in three steps. The first two apply also for m > 3 are are stated for general m.
Step 1
The first step is based on the work of [Ka02] and concerns Social Welfare Functions: n → {0, 1}, and Δ(f, DICT ) > , then F has probability of at least δ of not having a Generalized Condorcet Winner. For m = 3, 4, 5, δ = C , where C > 0 is an absolute constant.
The case m = 3, which is all that is needed for our main theorem, was proved by [Ka02] .
Also, since our starting point is assuming that F is not close to a dictatorship, it is worthwhile noting that in principle, when is sufficiently small, Δ(f, DICT ) = θ(mΔ(F, DICT )).
Step 2
The second step is a reduction from social welfare functions to social choice functions, with a different notion of manipulation: by many voters. I.e. this definition captures the scenario where all players together attempt to manipulate f to be b rather than a by re-choosing at random all their preferences -except those between a and b. This definition does not require that anyone in particular gain from this, just that something "unexpected" happens.
Our reduction works as follows. Given a SCF f with low M a,b (f ) for all a, b, we construct a neutral GSWF F (satisfying the IIA property,) that is close to always having a Generalized Condorcet Winner, hence, by Lemma 1, close to DICT . Our construction will be such that this will imply that f too is close to DICT , hence: 
Step 3
The third step shows that, for m = 3, the probability of this type of multi-voter manipulation yields a lower bound on the probability of single-voter manipulation:
Lemma 3. For every SCF f on 3 alternatives and every
The combination of this lemma with lemma 2 immediately implies the main theorem. We do not know how to generalize this lemma to m > 3.
Proof of Step 1
The case m = 3 of Lemma 1 is shown in 
Balanced here means that for all a, b ∈
n . This condition is certainly true for neutral functions since for those
. This theorem implies lemma 1 for the case m = 3 since in this case having a Generalized Condorcet Winner in F (x) is equivalent to being a full order, F (x) ∈ L, i.e. for m = 3, SW F = CW .
For m > 3, having a Generalized Condorcet Winner is a weaker requirement than being a full order, and thus Kalai's theorem does not directly imply lemma 1. The cases of m = 4, 5 are proved in appendix 1. At this point we can prove the lemma for all values of m using full induction. Once we have lemma 1 for values m 1 and m 2 then we can also deduce it for m = m 1 + m 2 . Let F = f ⊗( m 2 ) , and f be -far from dictatorship. Using the lemma on m 1 , m 2 we get that with probability at least δ m1 there is no Generalized Condorect Winner among the first m 1 alternatives and with probability at least δ m2 there is no Generalized Condorcet Winner among the last m 2 alternatives. The key point here is that these two events are independent since the voter preferences within two disjoint sets of alternatives are totally independent of each other. Thus the probability that there is no Generalized Condorect Winner at all is at least δ m1 ·δ m2 . Staring with δ = C for m = 3, 4, 5 we get δ ≥ (C ) 
Proof of Step 2
We will use any function f with low M a,b for all a, b ∈ [m] to construct a neutral IIA GSWF F that is close to always having a Generalized Condorcet Winner.
Definition 4. For every a, b ∈
and to be b if the reverse inequality holds. (Here, for sake of clarity we write the output of F a,b as a or b rather than 0 or 1.) In the case of equality we break the tie defining This defines an IIA GSWF F .
It will be convenient to analyze F using a measure that is closely related to M a,b :
Definition 5. We will say that x is a minority preference
We say that x is a minority preference if it is a minority preference for at least some pair (a, b). Denote by
It is easy to relate N a,b to M a,b , using the CauchySchwarz inequality:
Lemma 4. For every SCF f and every a, b we have that
Proof. Fix f and a, b.
where the probabilities are taken over a random x ∈ L whose (a, b)'th column agrees with the given one x a,b . In these terms
So we can bound
where the second inequality is Cauchy-Schwarz.
We are now ready to prove the properties of the constructed F .
3. If f is neutral then so is F .
Proof. Fix x that is not a minority preference and denote a = f (x). Note that by definition for all b we must have that F a,b (x) = a and thus a is a Generalized Condorcet Winner in F (x).
Item 1 follows since we get immediately that the distance from CW is bounded from above by the probability that x is a minority preference.
For item 2, for those x with F (x) = Dict i (x) we get that x a,b i = 1 and thus a is the top choice of x i and thus
Item 3 is trivial by definition.
From this lemma it follows that a SCF f that is far from dictatorship and has low multi-voter manipulation M a,b (f ) yields an IIA SWF that is far from dictatorship and close to always having a Generalized Condorcet Winner.
We should note that a certain converse is true as well. If we have an IIA GSWF F with Δ(F, CW ) ≤ then we can define f (x) to be the Generalized Condorcet Winner of F (x) (and some other candidate if a Generalized Condorcet Winner does not exist -this rule can be made to retain neutrality). Note that due to F beeing IIA, f (x) = a and f (x ) = b with
Proof of Step 3
In this section we study the combinatorial structures underlying M a,b (f ) and i M i (f ) and relating them.
For the rest of this section let us fix the set of alternatives [m] = {a, b, c} and fix a SCF f .
Definition 6. For every value of
Note that for every possible value of z a,b there are exactly 3
n possible values of x that agree with it: in x the preferences of all voters between a and b are given and each voter may choose one of three locations for c: above both a and b, below both of them, or between them. Thus, for every fixed z a,b it will be usefull to view the set {x|x In these terms we can directly express M a,b (f ):
Proof. This is just a re-wording of the definition of M a,b (f ).
In order to relate M i (f ) to these sets we need to add directed edges to {0, 1, 2}
n that capture (some of) the profitable manipulations by player i. For each fixed value of x a,b , for each player i and each v −i we will have 3 directed edges going in direction i between the possible values of v i : 0 → 1, 1 → 2, and 0 → 2. We will count the directed edges going "upward" from A and from B.
Definition 7. For a subset A ⊆ {0, 1, 2} n , its upper edge border, ∂A is the set of directed edges defined above whose tail is in A and whose head is not in A. Formally,
We now relate M i (f ) to the upper edge border in direction i.
Proof. Let us choose x and x at random, differing only (possibly) in that x i may be different from x i and provide a lower bound on the probability that the ith coordinate of one is a profitable manipulation of the other. We perform this random choice as follows: first x a,b and the rest of the analysis will be conditioned on this indeed happening (a conditioning that does not affect the distribution chosen). We next choose v −i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
n−1 and finally v i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and v i ∈ {0, 1, 2} are chosen at random. Note that if (v −i , v i , v i ) ∈ ∂ i A then either x i is a manipulation of x or x i is a manipulation of x . This is because when moving from x i to x i voter i lowered his relative preference of c without changing his ranking of the pair (a, b), with f (x) changing from a to some other result t ∈ {b, c}. If, according to x i , voter i prefers t to a then x i is a manipulation. If, in the other case, x i ranks a above t then this is definitely true for x i too, since when moving from x i to x i a's rank relative to b did not change, whereas it improved relative to c. Hence, in the second case x i is a manipulation of x . Thus every edge in ∂ i A corresponds to a pair x, x that is chosen with probability 1 2 · 3 −n · 1 3 , which contributes in total
Summing over i we get 
A Social Welfare Functions with m = 4, 5
In this appendix we will deduce the generalization of Kalai's theorem for m = 4, 5 from the case m = 3. Unfortunately, so far we have had no success in pushing these methods further.
Our starting point is the following version of Theorem 2 (which follows easily from the original version).
Theorem 3.
There exists a constant δ 3 > 0 such that the following holds. Let F be a neutral IIA GSWF, with n voters and 3 alternatives, determined by a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. Let C 3 (F ) be the probability over X that F (X) has a Generalized Condorcet Winner. Then
What we prove is the same for m = 4, 5:
Theorem 4. For m = 4, 5, there exists a constant δ m > 0 such that the following holds. Let F be a neutral IIA GSWF, with n voters and m alternatives, determined by a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. Let C m (F ) be the probability over X that F (X) has a Generalized Condorcet Winner. Then
We begin by considering the case m = 4. Let there be four candidates {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let X ij be the random 0/1 variable that indicates the event that i beats j according to F (X) where X is chosen at random. Note that, from neutrality, the probability of F (X) having a Generalized Condorcet Winner is precisely four times the probability that candidate 1 is a Generalized Condorcet Winner. Hence (1 − X j1 )].
(1)
Before expanding this, note the following. From neutrality of F it follows that f is balanced, hence for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}
Next, for any i, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, we use the theorem for m = 3 on the set {1, i, j} to get
Finally, from neutrality, the probability of candidate 1 being a Generalized Condorcet Winner is precisely equal to the probability of him being a Generalized Condorcet Loser, i.e.
E[
Now, using these observations we expand (1) to get Rearranging, and using (2) we get, C 6 (F ) 3 + 5C 3 (F ) 3 − 1 = C 5 (F ).
Since 1 ≥ C 6 (F ), and (1−δ 3 Δ(f, DICT )) ≥ C 3 (F ) This yields 
